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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE REFUGEE
STATUS DETERMINATION
PROCEDURE FOR VIETNAMESE
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN HONG KONG:
THE CASE OF DO GIAU
Arthur C. Helton*
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent Hong Kong court decision' has begun to draw into
question the validity of the refugee status determination used in
the colony for Vietnamese asylum seekers. The decision, which
quashed a determination denying refugee status to an individual
asylum seeker,2 will likely lead to additional judicial challenges
to Hong Kong's refugee status procedure and intensify the de-
bate regarding the mandatory repatriation of Vietnamese to
Vietnam.3
This Article describes the background to the continuing ar-
rival of the Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong. The efforts
of the international community to cope with the arrivals are dis-
cussed, including the United Nations Comprehensive Plan of
Action4 (CPA) concerning Indo-Chinese refugees, and the estab-
* Director of the Refugee Project, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New
York City; member New York bar; A.B. 1971, Columbia University; J.D. 1976, New York
University. Mr. Helton helped to organize the judicial challenge that is the subject of
this Article.
1. R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do Giau
and others (1990 MP No. 570, 622, 623, 624, 636, 931, 932, 933, and 934) Supreme Court
of Hong Kong, High Court, Miscellaneous Proceedings (Mortimer, J.). A copy of the final
judgment, dated April 15, 1991, is on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law.
2. Id. at 65.
3. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
4. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: International
Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, (Agenda Item 111(c)), at para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
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lishment of status determination procedures in Hong Kong in
connection with the CPA. The facts of the case in question and
the court's decision are described, and the correctness and im-
port of the decision are analyzed.
II. BACKGROUND
Sixteen years after the fall of Saigon the international com-
munity continues to attempt to cope with the displacement of
Vietnamese boat people. After South Vietnam surrendered in
April 1975, a stream of Vietnamese began to leave. Reasons for
flight included harsh "re-education" of those associated with the
old regime, the persecution of ethnic Chinese, deterioration of
living conditions coupled with food shortage, drought, flood, and
a desire to avoid military service under the new regime. By 1979,
some 600,000 Vietnamese had left.5
The magnitude of the exodus and harsh reactions by neigh-
boring countries in the region provided the impetus for the
world's first effort in 1979 to address the problem. Governments
in the region refused to allow the boat people to land, and many
of the Vietnamese perished in the South China Sea.'
The crisis inspired an international response. On May 31,
1979, the British Prime Minister proposed to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations (Secretary General) that an interna-
tional conference be convened to deal with the problem. A
meeting was called, and sixty-five countries attended the confer-
ence from June 20-21, 1979. In his opening statement, the Secre-
tary General underlined the crucial importance of maintaining
the principles of "first asylum" and "non-refoulement" 8 for refu-
44/523 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Conference].
5. See Wain, The Indochina Refugee Crisis, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 160, 166 (1979).
6. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, UNCERTAIN HARBORS: THE PLIGHT OF VIETNAMESE
BOAT PEOPLE 4 (1987).
7. Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia: Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (Agenda Item 83), at para. 6, U.N.
Doc. A/34/627 (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Conference].
8. This is the principle that no refugee should be returned to a country where his or
her life or freedom would be endangered. See Helton, What Is Refugee Protection?, 2
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 119, 126 (1990). Non-refoulement provisions are included in several
United Nations instruments, including article 33 of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
of 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. A similar provision is included in article 3 of the Decla-
ration on Territorial Asylum. G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII) (Dec. 14, 1967), 1967 U.N.Y.B. 758.
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gees arriving either by land or by sea, recognizing that countries
of asylum expected reassurance that they would not bear the fi-
nal burden and that all refugees would be resettled abroad in
other countries." The conference focused on the need for inter-
national burden sharing to increase resettlement opportunities
within the international community, thereby easing the strain on
Indo-Chinese countries and Hong Kong which could no longer
absorb the flow of asylum seekers. 10
The rate of departure fell from approximately 25,000 per
month from January to July to about 4,000 per month from Au-
gust to December in 1979, primarily as a result of enforcement
efforts undertaken by Vietnam to stop unauthorized depar-
tures.1" The conference arrangement for resettlement stabilized
the situation and established a framework in which to consider
the problem. Consequently, the issue largely dropped out of
public discussion.
The 1979 conference arrangement began to unravel when
arrivals outstripped falling resettlement quotas in the late 1980s.
In Hong Kong, arrivals began to exceed resettlement departures
in 1986 after Vietnam suspended its orderly departure program
to the United States, which was to accept refugees from within
Vietnam for resettlement. As the number of refugees taken for
resettlement in third countries dwindled, the number seeking
asylum increased. In Hong Kong, the number of arrivals in-
creased from 3,395 in 1987 to 18,446 in 1988. In May 1989 over
8,900 asylum seekers arrived in Hong Kong, bringing the total
over 37,000.12
United States domestic law reflects this policy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1991). Even
states not parties to the United Nations instruments are bound to respect non-refoule-
ment as a fundamental principle of customary international law. See G. GOODWIN-GILL,
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1983); Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII), in United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on the International
Protection of Refugees, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 14
(1980) [hereinafter (UNHCR), Conclusions]; Report on the Twenty-Eighth Session of
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme at para. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/549 (Oct. 1977).
9. 1979 Conference, supra note 7, at para. 12.
10. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Refugees, June 1989, at 21.
The conference participants agreed that Indo-Chinese countries and Hong Kong would
provide first asylum to Vietnamese boat people while the international community would
offer final settlement opportunities. OXFAM, VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE AND REFUGEES IN
HONG KONG para. 2 (1989).
11. B. WAIN, THE REFUSED: THE AGONY OF THE INDOCHINA REFUGEES 79 (1981).
12. LAWYERS CoMnrTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INHUMANE DETERRENCE: THE TREAT-
MENT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 8 (1989) [hereinafter LAWYERS
1991] 265
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To deter arrivals, on June 16, 1988, Hong Kong initiated a
screening and detention policy. Vietnamese who arrived in the
colony after that cutoff date would be examined to determine
refugee status and potential resettlement abroad. Those
screened as refugees would be held in camps pending resettle-
ment. Those pending adjudication and those rejected for status
would be detained pending return to Vietnam. 13
III. THE UNITED NATIONS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
A further international response was organized. On June 13
and 14, 1989, representatives of seventy-five governments met at
an International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Ge-
neva.14 The purpose of the conference was to endorse a plan to
cope with the continuing flight of Vietnamese asylum seekers.
Specifically, the governments sought to establish procedures to
screen asylum seekers on a region wide basis to determine which
among them deserved resettlement as refugees. In addition, the
participants attempted to organize the detention and possible
return, including deportation, to Vietnam of those rejected for
status. 5
Central to the CPA was the establishment of refugee status
determination processes in the region."' Implementing such
screening procedures had been problematic in the past; process-
ing applicants for refugee status was frought with delays. More-
over, extremely few asylum seekers were screened as genuine
refugees with a "well-founded fear of persecution" in Vietnam.
As of April 1989, for example, only three of over 1,300
Vietnamese cases had been recognized by the Hong Kong au-
thorities as entitled to refugee status.1
COMMITTEE].
13. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 10-11. Hong Kong declared that the
screening procedures would be carried out under United Nations criteria to determine if
Vietnamese arrivals were genuine refugees having a "well-founded fear of persecution"
under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Peterson, Hong Kong An-
nounces Tightening of Refugee Acceptance, Reuters (June 15, 1988) (NEXIS). The 1951
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol are the primary sources of international obli-
gations toward refugees. Hull, Displaced Persons: The New Refugees, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 755, 759 (1983).
14. 1989 Conference, supra note 4, at para. 10.
15. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, passim.
16. LAWYERS COMMITrEE, supra note 12, at 13.
17. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 4. For a discussion on the introduction of
screening in Hong Kong, see Mushkat, Refuge in Hong Kong, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 449
(1989).
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The CPA seeks to establish a "consistent, region-wide refu-
gee status determination process to be conducted in accordance
with national legislation and internationally accepted prac-
tice." '18 Consultations were undertaken by the office of the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) with
concerned governments resulting in a recognition that interna-
tional criteria should govern status determinations, that the of-
fice of UNHCR should have ready access at all stages of the pro-
cedure, and that the authorities should cooperate with
nongovernmental organizations. 19
IV. PROCEDURES IN HONG KONG
Upon interception in Hong Kong waters, Vietnamese boat
people are informed that they are illegally entering the territory.
If they insist on remaining, a status determination procedure is
to be carried out in accordance with the strictures of the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees 20 and the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status21 under a Statement of Under-
standing between the UNHCR and Hong Kong authorities.22
The UNHCR is an exclusive source of legal advice and assis-
tance to asylum seekers in the screening and review procedures,
and is to have access to the Vietnamese for this purpose.23
Interviews are conducted by an Immigration Department
officer, who is assisted by an interpreter. The officer completes a
questionnaire and makes a recommendation on the case, includ-
ing an assessment of the applicant's credibility. Legal counsel-
lors of the UNHCR have access to the examination to monitor
the screening interview. The interviewer's recommendation is re-
viewed by superiors, who make the final decision regarding refu-
18. Note on National Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status, Annex
I, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 148/4 (May 1989).
19. Id. at paras. 1, 24.
20. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 8; 1967 Protocol, supra note 8.
21. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CON-
VENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (Geneva, Sept.
1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. It has come to be recognized as an authoritative source of
guidance for adjudicators. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22
(1987).
22. Interview with Michael Hansen, Refugee Coordinator, Security Branch, in Hong
Kong (May 24, 1990); see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 26.
23. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 26.
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gee status. If the final decision is negative, the applicant is to be
informed of the denial and of the right to appeal. At the time of
notification of the denial, a copy of the Immigration Department
file is given to UNHCR and a legal consultant at the Agency for
Volunteer Service, established by UNHCR, so that they may
consider assisting asylum seekers with a review. An objection to
the status determination must be lodged with the Immigration
Department within fourteen days of notice of the determination.
Within four to six weeks, the applicant must submit a written
statement for review. 24
On May 31, 1989, a Refugee Status Review Board (RSRB or
Review Board) was established by legislation as a reviewing
body. The RSRB is headed by a former judge and is organized
in four two-person panels whose members are drawn from the
civil service and the community at large. A positive decision by
one panel member suffices to overturn a negative screening deci-
sion. While legal assistance may be offered to some applicants in
preparing cases for review, no legal representation is permitted
at the review itself. Oral evidence is not given at the Review
Board, although some asylum seekers are reinterviewed by
Board members. UNHCR monitors some of these second
interviews.25
As of April 1991 the Director of Immigration has completed
screening for 22,606 persons, of whom 3,028 were accepted as
refugees (thirteen percent), including on family unity grounds,
and 19,578 were denied refugee status (eighty-seven percent).
The RSRB has reviewed the cases of 16,993 persons. Upon re-
view the Director of Immigration's decision has been upheld for
15,520 persons and overturned for 1,478.26
The screening procedure in Hong Kong has been very con-
troversial. Worthy cases have been reported rejected, including
Vietnamese who had been subjected to harsh re-education and
forced labor measures." Amnesty International has criticized
the procedure as having "critical flaws" and has made recom-
mendations to enhance the procedure, including the provision of
more systematic legal counseling and requiring the RSRB to
24. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 21.
25. See LAwYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 21.
26. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT FACT SHEET: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG
KONG, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Apr. 1991) (Status Determination Procedures).
27. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at All,
col. 1.
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state reasons for negative decisions on appeal.28
The screening interviews have been criticized as intimidat-
ing and humiliating for the applicant. This atmosphere inhibits
persons from providing important details of their lives in Viet-
nam that would demonstrate they have a genuine fear of perse-
cution and therefore warrant refugee status. Most applicants do
not understand the reasons underlying particular questions be-
cause they have received no legal counseling prior to the inter-
view. Without such advice, applicants cannot respond ade-
quately to questions designed to elicit evidence of persecution.
In addition, the immigration officer conducting the interview
may exacerbate the applicant's confusion by asking questions in
a random fashion. This piecemeal approach to the examination
hinders the applicant's ability to clearly describe his or her ex-
periences in Vietnam. Moreover, the duration of the interview
28. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF HONG KONG
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS
IN HONG KONG 51, 52 (Jan. 1990). In 1989, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
reported and recommended that:
10. In practice, the screening process does not provide an adequate basis for
determining whether asylum seekers have valid claims. Examiners have not
given the benefit of the doubt to applicants in the screening process. Sufficient
guidance has not been provided to applicants or examiners. In some instances,
examiners do not fully answer the interview questionnaires. Translation ser-
vices provided by the Hong Kong authorities are sometimes inadequate. In
many cases, examiners do not even inform the applicants of the purpose of the
examination. Little, if anything, is done to create an atmosphere which would
engender trust and disclosure. Generally, examiners fail to ask the probing
questions necessary to help an applicant articulate a claim for refugee protec-
tion. The training of adjudicators is inadequate, and most interviewers lack
knowledge of conditions in Viet Nam.
11. Several steps should be taken immediately to improve the interview pro-
cess. Vietnamese asylum seekers should be provided with a written explanation
in Vietnamese of the screening process, including criteria and procedures. Le-
gal counseling should be readily available to asylum seekers prior to interviews.
Examinations should be recorded on tape, so that a record exists that an attor-
ney or a UNHCR representative can review in the event an asylum seeker de-
cides to appeal an adverse determination and in order to monitor the adjudica-
tion process generally. Rejected applicants should be informed of the reasons
for an adverse decision and provided with ready access to counsel to appeal.
12. A special task force of well-trained, professional adjudicators should be as-
sembled by Hong Kong to perform refugee status determinations, outside the
ambit of the immigration authorities. The use of immigration examiners in ref-
ugee status adjudications is generally inappropriate, given their immigration
law enforcement background, which is fundamentally incompatible with the
humanitarian standards necessary to decide asylum cases and fairly assess the
claims of asylum seekers.
LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 5.
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may not permit the asylum seeker to provide a complete account
of his or her treatment in Vietnam. Some examinations last only
one hour. Even if the applicant does provide a detailed narra-
tive, crucial details may be lost in translation. Interpreters pre-
sent during the screening interview frequently speak a dialect
that differs from that of the asylum seeker. This communication
barrier increases the risk that the applicant will misconstrue the
interview questions and that the examiner will be insensitive to
subtleties in the asylum seeker's answer.2"
29. One commentator described the screening interviews in the following terms:
The case of Phan Hai, a fisherman from South Vietnam, provides an illus-
trative example. I spoke with Mr. Hai for hours at a time on several different
occasions. He told me that after the communist takeover in April 1975, the
communists tortured his mother and father before his very eyes, sent his father
to a re-education camp where he was paralysed and almost killed, banished his
family from their village, forcing them to live illegally on a tiny fishing junk,
and expelled him from public school though he was only fourteen years old.
Mr. Hai said that he himself was brutally tortured after having evaded the
draft because, among other reasons, "I did not believe that I should fight for a
government that treated my family so badly and denied us all of our rights as
human beings." At the time of his departure, Mr. Hai had been living in hiding
for seven years and was in fear for his life.
Shortly after his arrival in Hong Kong in April 1989, Mr. Hai was briefly
interviewed for basic information by a Hong Kong official who, he says, "bade
me with his hand to kneel down in front of him." The official spoke in a "harsh
and shrill" tone and constantly banged on the table, causing Mr. Hai such fear
that he could not even remember the names of his children. Mr. Hai told me
that four months later he was interviewed for one hour by a Hong Kong immi-
gration officer, to determine his refugee status. He said that he only learned of
the interview the day before, and he was given no prior legal counselling or
advice, or any written information about the interview. He described his inter-
view as follows:
"... the immigration officer [said] I should tell him the story about why I left
Vietnam. I began to answer this question, but [he] interrupted me and went on
to the next question. I tried to go back to the question about why I had left
Vietnam, but [he] and the interpreter started laughing with each other. The
immigration officer jumped from question to question from before 1975 to after
1975 without any kind of order or relation between them. I asked [him] to give
me time to tell my story, but he threw his pen on the desk and said just answer
the questions asked .... I had the impression he just wanted to get it over
with as quickly as possible .... He and the interpreter made fun of and
laughed at me. Sometimes, they would pause and look at each other between
questions showing expressions of disbelief. At one point, the immigration of-
ficer said that I had come to Hong Kong and now I had some meat to eat so
that I must feel good. I felt so humiliated that I broke down and cried. I told
him that I did not come for meat but because I feared persecution. They just
laughed at me some more."
Wolf, A Subtle Form of Inhumanity: Screening of the Boat People in Hong Kong, 2
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 161, 163-64 (1990).
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V. THE CASE OF Do GIAU
Mr. Do Giau is a twenty-four-year-old Vietnamese man. He
came to Hong Kong on July 16, 1988, along with his sister, her
husband and their two children. His younger brother also ac-
companied him on the same boat. When they were apprehended
by the Hong Kong authorities they were detained at the White-
head Detention Centre.30 Mr. Do's family had been "badly ill-
treated since 1975 following the collapse of the government of
South Vietnam." 3' Mr. Do's father served in various government
positions in South Vietnam. He was a soldier from 1951 to 1955,
during which period he was wounded. He also served as hamlet
chief from 1967 to 1969, being promoted to village chief in 1970,
a position he held until 1975.32 Mr. Do's family was relatively
wealthy and well-known because of his father's administrative
position over an area with a total population of about 30,000 to
40,000 persons.3
In 1975, Mr. Do's mother and four sisters were killed in a
communist invasion. After the communist takeover in 1975, Mr.
Do returned with his family to their home in Hue. Shortly after
returning, his father was arrested and detained in the village po-
lice station. His father was then publicly denounced and beaten,
and sent for long-term "re-education" in a camp.3 4 Five years
later, Mr. Do's father returned in poor condition. 5 Mr. Do's fa-
ther reported torture, including beatings and confinement under
onerous circumstances. He reported forced labor, including
clearing thick jungle in areas where mines had been laid. These
mines sometimes killed workers who stepped on the explosives. 6
As to himself, Mr. Do reported that he and other siblings
had been prevented from going to school and undertaking uni-
30. Affirmation of Do Giau, March 2, 1990, at paras. 1, 2 (copy on file with the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Affirmation of Do Giau].
31. Id. at para. 4. Commentators continue to report human rights violations in Viet-
nam. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, VIETNAM: RENOVATION (Doi MOI), THE LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1980'S (1990).
32. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 4.
33. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 5.
34. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 7, 8.
35. Mr. Do described his father's deteriorated condition:
I could not even recognize him because he was just skin covering bones.
He was hunched over as a result of his sufferings and could not stand straight.
He had lost most of his hair and teeth. He was suffering from malaria, which
he still has today. From then on, he has been a weakened man.
Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 8.
36. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 8.
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versity studies. The communist authorities had confiscated their
family farm in January of 1976.3" He and the other children
were sent to a New Economic Zone (NEZ) which was located in
the middle of mountainous jungle. All of the NEZ inhabitants
had ties with the previous government and military of South Vi-
etnam.3" The NEZ was patrolled by armed security forces to
prevent escape. NEZ inhabitants lived under primitive condi-
tions, without electricity or running water. The work included
leveling the ground and removing mines and live grenades a.3
These harsh living conditions were aggravated by inade-
quate medical care and education.40 When Mr. Do's father was
released from the re-education camp in 1981, he joined his fam-
ily in the NEZ. One of his brothers, who was arrested for pro-
testing the failure to grant him permission to leave the NEZ,
was tortured by the police.41 Mr. Do escaped from the NEZ to
Hue where he was expelled from school after he could not pro-
duce his family registration documents.42 He also asked permis-
sion to become a construction worker. The request was refused.
According to Mr. Do, "They said that my family still had a
'blood debt' and that I had not fulfilled the criteria to do any
work for the government. 43
Mr. Do refused to comply with a draft order for military
service he received in 1986. He fled upon learning that army se-
curity forces had decided to arrest him, and hid with relatives in
another locale.44 Mr. Do was then arrested in connection with an
escape attempt organized by his brother. According to Mr. Do,
he was tortured and interrogated by the local police about the
escape.45 After three days of confinement, he was released and
37. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 9, 10.
38. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 10, 11.
39. Mr. Do described this aspect of the work in detail:
We had to dig up the mines and the grenades with our bear [sic] hands. I
saw many people killed and injured doing this work. My brother's arm was
injured and is still partially paralysed as a result. I was always very afraid and
had nightmares about being blown up. Sometimes I woke up screaming. I had
to do this work, clearing the forest and removing the mines, 11 to 12 days a
month for three months.
Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 14.
40. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 16, 17.
41. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 20.
42. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 21.
43. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 22.
44. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 23, 24, 25.
45. Mr. Do described his treatment:
I was taken to the local police station where I was interrogated and tor-
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resumed hiding.46
Mr. Do was arrested again in July of 1987 and was severely
beaten. Although he was released to go back to the NEZ, Mr. Do
refused to return and again went into hiding.47 He left Vietnam
for Hong Kong on July 9, 1988.8
Mr. Do was interviewed by an Immigration Department of-
ficer on July 26 and August 9, 1989. He was denied asylum on
September 6, 1989, and appealed the negative status determina-
tion to the RSRB. He received notice of the refusal of his appeal
on December 7, 1989.19
VI. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mr. Do Giau sought judicial review of the administrative re-
jection of his refugee claim in March of 1990 with the assistance
of lawyers appointed by the Hong Kong Legal Aid Depart-
ment.50 The litigation was an unusual cooperative effort between
lawyers in Hong Kong, Britain, and the United States. After a
visit to Hong Kong in January to lay the groundwork for a chal-
lenge, lawyers from Britain and the United States continued to
provide backup assistance to the solicitors and barristers in
Hong Kong." After preliminary proceedings, the case proceeded
to hearing in November 1990. The hearing lasted thirty-six days,
spanning the period from November 19, 1990 to January 28,
1991. A sixty-eight page decision was rendered on February 18,
1991.52
The first issue the court considered concerned the admis-
tured. I was surrounded by three security officers who took turns beating me
up. I was beaten so hard that I passed out. They poured water on me and
threw me in a cell. During the interrogation, they thought I was one of the
organizers so they asked me many questions about how the escape was
planned.
Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 27.
46. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at paras. 27, 28.
47. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 30.
48. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para. 31.
49. Affirmation of Do Giau, supra note 30, at para 3.
50. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1991, at A3, col. 1. On the remedy of judicial review
under English law, see S. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 17, 18 (1987) [here-
inafter S. LEGOMSKY].
51. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at All, col. 1. An intervention from the office of the
UNHCR and expert affidavits were organized by lawyers in the United States for sub-
mission in the litigation in Hong Kong.
52. R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do
Giau and others (1990 MP No. 570, 622, 623, 624, 636, 931, 932, 933, and 934) Supreme
Court of Hong Kong, High Court, Miscellaneous Proceedings (Mortimer, J.).
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sion of evidence regarding conditions in Vietnam. 53 The court
refused to admit general evidence of conditions in Vietnam. It
concluded that such evidence was inadmissible because informa-
tion on country conditions did not relate to procedural irregular-
ities or unfairness in the status determination procedures. The
decision, however, acknowledged that evidence of conditions in
Vietnam might be "necessary" with respect to information a
particular applicant was unable to bring to the attention of the
interviewing officer. 4
53. Extensive expert affirmations on conditions in Vietnam were offered by Mr. Do's
counsel from Stephen Denney, an archivist at the Indochina Archive of the Institute of
East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, and Nguyen Dinh Tu, a
Vietnamese journalist who had worked in that capacity since 1945, and who was impris-
oned on political grounds from 1975 to 1988, when he was released, and in 1989 fled to
Hong Kong where he was given refugee status. Messrs. Denney's and Nguyen's affirma-
tions are on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law.
54.
[T]his evidence does not go to show procedural irregularity or unfairness
in relation to the hearings. If at any stage in the future, it becomes necessary
to consider what a particular applicant wanted to bring to the notice of the
immigration officer but was not able to bring before him, I suppose it is possi-
ble that some part of this evidence may become admissible but at present, it is
not.
Similarly, unless the matters to which the evidence is directed, can be
demonstrated to the court, general evidence of "country conditions" in order
that this court should be generally informed as a background to its enquiry
cannot be admitted. This also would be wrong in principle having regard to the
limited nature of the court's powers in judicial review proceedings.
Director of Immigration ex parte Do Giau, 1990 Supreme Court of Hong Kong, at 9
(copy on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
An interlocutory appeal on the question of the admissibility of expert evidence was
taken, and the Court of Appeals ruled:
[W]e have been taken in the course of this appeal through all the relevant
material. I have re-read it again in my own time. The written testimony, as one
would expect in the circumstances, is presented very differently from much of
the official information but overall I find no significant difference or omission.
Like the judge I find nothing to indicate that either the Immigration Officers
or the Board were ignorant of any material fact or got any such fact plainly
wrong.
It is well established that a judge may exclude evidence which can in no
way properly advance the claim of the litigant. In that sense it is irrelevant. In
my view the judge was correct so to exercise his discretion in the present
instance.
R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do Giau and
others, decision of the Court of Appeals, 1990, No. 185, (Civil) 13 Dec. 1990, Sir Derek
Cons, VP, Kempster and Clough, JJA, at 12 (copy on file with the Brooklyn Journal of
International Law).
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A. Contentions of the Parties
Mr. Do based his appeal on several grounds which the court
summarized at the hearing on the merits.55
First, he submitted that the examination conducted by the
immigration officer was unfair and therefore was either proce-
durally irregular or in breach of the rules of natural justice. He
based the argument that the interview was unfair on factors that
stemmed from omissions made before and after the examination
and on the manner in which the examination was conducted. In
addition, Mr. Do argued that the failure to record the interview
properly also contributed to the unfair nature of the entire
examination.56
Second, Mr. Do argued that a decision based on "a plain
mistake of fact" can be quashed as a legal matter. Accordingly,
the immigration officer's decision to deny Mr. Do refugee status
should have been reversed because it was based on a number of
factual errors. Those errors related to:
(1)The type of New Economic Zone in which the applicant
lived and worked for many years.
(2)The nature of conscriptive labour which his father was re-
quired to carry out there and which he was required to carry
out.
(3)The consequences of a loss of household registration when
he left the New Economic Zone.
(4)The effect of him receiving a draft for military service.
(5)The erroneous recording of the fact that he worked in a
state-owned rice mill and its consequences.57
55. Director of Immigration ex parte Do Giau, 1990 Supreme Court of Hong Kong,
at 18.
56.
Mr. Fung [Mr. Do's counsel] . . . submits that the immigration officer's
examination lacked fairness and therefore was procedurally irregular or was in
breach of the rules of natural justice. Three broad matters are advanced:
(1)Omissions before the examination.
(2)The manner in which the examination was conducted and the failure
to record the examination properly.
(3)Omissions at the conclusion of the examination.
Id.
57. Id. at 18, 19. The court added that
[some] of these matters are put in other ways. It was argued that the immigra-
tion officer wrongly concluded that the applicant was not a target for persecu-
tion because he had received papers drafting him for military service and also,
that the officer had erroneously recorded his employment in a state-owned rice
mill, took this into account adversely to the applicant and therefore concluded
erroneously that he was not targeted for persecution. On these matters and
1991]
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Third, Mr. Do argued that the immigration officer failed to
fulfill the procedural requirements for screening as set forth
under Hong Kong immigration law.5 8 Mr. Do based this conten-
tion on the ground that the immigration officer had breached
Regulation 7(b) of the Immigration Ordinance by failing to
make available to the Review Board all material upon which his
decision was based. This breach arose because the officer had
destroyed his original notes of the interview which were there-
fore unavailable for review. s
In addition to attacking the immigration officer's denial of
refugee status, Mr. Do also charged that the Review Board's af-
firmation of the decision should be reversed as procedurally un-
fair and in breach of the rules of natural justice. Mr. Do argued
that the Review Board's decision was unfair because he was not
permitted to attend the hearing on his case. Thus, he was not
permitted to address factual disputes that had arisen between
himself and the immigration officer concerning the initial exami-
nation. Moreover, he was not able to explain differences in the
evidence the immigration officer had recorded and evidence ad-
vanced on appeal to the Review Board. Also, Mr. Do argued that
the Review Board should have given reasons for its decision de-
spite section 13F(8) of the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance
which does not contain such a requirement.6 0
Mr. Do argued further that the infirmities and errors in the
adjudication of his claim constituted an abuse of discretion stan-
dard as enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp."'
others, it is submitted that the immigration officer's decision was unreasonable
and perverse in the Wednesbury sense.
Id. at 19. See infra note 61.
58. Hong Kong does not have its own citizenship or nationality law; however, it has
enacted immigration procedures embodied in the Immigration Ordinance. Clarke, Hong
Kong Immigration Control: The Law and the Bureaucratic Maze, 16 HONG KONo L.J.
342 (1986). See also LAWS OF HONG KONG IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE (1987 ed.) [hereinaf-
ter IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE].
59. Director of Immigration ex parte Do Giau, 1990 Supreme Court of Hong Kong,
at 19, 20.
60. Id, at 20.
61. Id. at 20. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.
[1948] 1 KB 223 (CA), in which Lord Greene summarized the relevant principle:
I do not wish to repeat myself but I will summarize once again the principle
applicable. The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority
with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they
ought not to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which
they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of
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The Hong Kong government denied that there was any pro-
cedural unfairness relating to the immigration officer's examina-
tion or the Review Board hearing. With respect to Mr. Do's con-
tention that the examiner's decision was based on "a plain
mistake of fact," and therefore flawed, the government con-
tended that no such mistake had been demonstrated. Alterna-
tively, the government asserted that a decision can be chal-
lenged based on "a plain mistake of fact" only where such facts
are known to or available to the decision-maker. In this case, the
examining immigration officer could not have known that he
misconstrued facts given by Mr. Do during the interview. Ac-
cordingly, the decision was not flawed. The government also ar-
gued that the immigration officer did not wrongly take into ac-
count matters relating to Mr. Do's military draft or his
employment by a state-owned rice mill as evidence that refugee
status should be denied. The government disputed Mr. Do's
claim that the immigration officer had not followed statutory
procedure as set forth in the Immigration Ordinance because he
had made available to the Review Board the notes upon which
his decision was based. Finally, the government argued that
neither the immigration officer's nor the Review Board's deci-
sions were unreasonable or perverse under the Wednesbury
standard of review. 2
the local authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the local au-
thority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to
consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think
the court can interfere.
Id. at 233. This articulated principle is similar to concepts of abuse of discretion in
United States jurisprudence. See S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 50, at 175.
62. The court summarized the arguments of counsel for the Hong Kong Government
as follows:
(1) That there was no procedural unfairness relating to the immigration of-
ficer's examination or the Review Board hearing.
(2) That if "a plain mistake of fact" is a ground upon which a decision may be
flawed, this is limited to mistakes of fact known to or available to the decision-
maker at the time of his decision and further that no such mistake is demon-
strated in this case.
(3) That no mistake over the application of the proper policy criteria was made
nor is it shown that the wrong standard of proof was applied by either
tribunal.
(4) That the immigration officer did not wrongly take into account matters
relating to the draft or employment in a state-owned rice mill. These were
matters for the evaluation of the evidence by the officer.
(5) That the immigration officer's and the Review Board's decisions are not
demonstrated to be Wednesbury unreasonable or perverse.
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Counsel for Hong Kong also contended that the notion of
what is a "fair procedure" must be determined by regard to "all
of the circumstances. '63 According to Crown counsel, the follow-
ing factors should be considered:
(1) The problems created by the number of Vietnamese arriv-
als and the failure of the resettlement programme.
(2) The fact that the screening arrangements were made with
the consent, support and cooperation of the UNHCR.
(3) That the courts distinguish between the exercise of powers
to remove those who are unlawfully in Hong Kong and the ex-
ercise of powers to refuse entry to Hong Kong.6 '
Additionally, counsel for Hong Kong argued that Mr. Do
could prevail only if he could "demonstrate that he has suffered
some specific injustice or prejudice" and that any flaws in the
immigration officer's decision were "cured" by proceedings
before the RSRB. 5 Counsel submitted that "the court must not
involve itself in evaluation and assessment of the evidence" and
that the question of whether a refugee applicant's "subjective
fear of persecution" is "objectively well-founded" are issues
"which can only be decided by the [administrative] tribunals."66
As "perfection can never be achieved" in the decision-making
process, counsel argued that the immigration officer's and
RSRB's decisions should receive judicial deference.6 7 Further,
Hong Kong counsel argued that the RSRB need not give reasons
for decisions and that the court's jurisdiction to review the
RSRB's decisions had been "ousted" by statute. 8
B. The Court's Decision
In terms of review of the claim of "plain mistake of fact"69
(6) That the immigration officer did follow the statutory procedure in that he
made available the notes upon which his decision was in fact made...
Id. at 21, 22. See also supra note 61 for a discussion of the Wednesbury principle.
63. Director of Immigration ex parte Do Giav, 1990 Supreme Court of Hong Kong
at 22.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 24.
69. Id. The court explained:
After the submissions concerning the allegation of plain error of fact about the
effect of the applicant's draft for military service, I specifically ruled that in
Stephen Denney's affirmation of 18th April 1990, the formal paragraphs 1-4
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by the adjudicatory authorities, the court preliminarily rejected
a narrow scope of review. The court reasoned that if there is
proof that a decision-maker made a "material and decisive error
of fact" not actually known to him but easily ascertainable, such
evidence could be sufficient to demonstrate that the decision was
flawed. The court cautioned that such a determination "depends
upon the facts of the case." According to the court, material or
decisive facts would be those which were the primary basis for
the decision or facts which had to be taken into account for the
decision to be reached.7
The court also ordered, on the application of Mr. Do's coun-
sel, the cross examination of the Hong Kong Immigration De-
partment interviewer on the application of Mr. Do's counsel 1.7
The evidence elicited from the immigration officer regarding the
conduct of the interview did not trouble the court except for the
issue of translation errors. Addressing this matter, the court con-
cluded that "[tihere can be no doubt that the double interpreta-
tion and the choice of words involved led to some errors . . .
between [what] was said in Vietnamese and [what] was eventu-
ally recorded in English. '72 Additionally, the court stated that
"minor errors may have been made by the applicant in his ac-
count and by the immigration officer in his record. 7' Finally,
and paragraph 32 together with Nguyen Dinh Tu's affirmation dated 28th June
1990 formal paragraphs 1-9, and paragraphs 86 and 87 should be admitted. I
also admitted evidence from the respondent in reply.
Id. at 26. The cited paragraphs from Messrs. Denney's and Nguyen's affirmations con-
cern their expert qualifications as well as discrimination in military service.
70.
I do not accept that the court powers are quite so limited. If it is demon-
strated that a decision-maker made a material and decisive error of fact, which
although not actually known to him or available in his department but was
then easily available, generally known and unquestionably true, so that by in-
ference it must be assumed to have been within the knowledge of the depart-
ment, then if the other conditions are satisfied, this may be sufficient to show
that the decision was flawed. But much depends upon the facts of the case. I
would just add this that usually a material or decisive fact will be one which is
a condition precedent to jurisdiction; or one which is the only or the primary
basis for the decision, or a fact which the tribunal had to take into account in
order to reach its decision.
Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 27. The giving of evidence is an unusual occurrence in judicial review pro-
ceedings under English law. See S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 50, at 19-21.
72. R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do
Giau and others (1990 MP No. 570, 622, 623, 624, 636, 931, 932, 933, and 934) Supreme
Court of Hong Kong, High Court, Miscellaneous Proceedings (Mortimer, J.) at 32.
73. Id.
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
the court described the manner in which the "alleged deficien-
cies" in the notes taken by the immigration officer during the
interview could have occurred:
The applicant's evidence on certain matters could itself have
been mistaken or incomplete; the interpreter's version either of
question or answer could have been mistaken; his choice of
words could have been inappropriate; and the immigration of-
ficer's interpretation or choice of words from the Cantonese
similarly could have been mistaken or inappropriate; and fur-
ther he could have erred in transcribing his note. Alternatively,
the applicant may have later wished to change what he actually
said in order to gain some advantage.7 4
Based on this analysis, the court focused on one specific in-
stance in which the interpreter had mistranslated Mr. Do's
meaning. The court concluded that Mr. Do had never actually
said that he had worked in a "state-owned rice mill." According
to the court, "this was recorded as a consequence of an error of
interpretation or understanding. 75 The court also noted that
the issue of whether Mr. Do had ever been employed by the gov-
ernment was raised for the first time in his application for re-
view.7 '6 To avoid unnecessary evidentiary conflicts in the future,
the court recommended that all notes taken during screening in-
terviews be preserved. Saving interview notes would eliminate
questions concerning the accuracy of the transcript which would
be available for inspection if necessary.77 The court also noted
that records of the training seminar given to interviewers indi-
74. Id. at 32, 33.
75. Id. at 34.
76. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
This was recorded as a consequence of an error of interpretation or under-
standing. I note the immigration officer first checked the bio-data with the ap-
plicant. He corrected the applicant's place of birth in his own hand. . . . No
similar correction appears in the employment section where the words "self-
employed" are recorded . . . The immigration officer gave evidence that he
noticed this discrepancy on checking (that is the discrepancy in the bio-data)
but did not correct it because the error was obvious from the later note of the
interview. This I do not accept. If a discrepancy had been obvious to the officer
requiring correction at the time when he checked the bio-data, he would have
either corrected the bio-data or at least he would have made some reference to
the discrepancy in the later note. Also, it is highly likely that when recording
the later inconsistency, not only would he have noted that inconsistency but he
would also have asked further questions to resolve it.
Id. at 34.
77. Id. at 39.
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cated that the disposal of any interview records was
prohibited.78
In terms of assessing whether the refugee status determina-
tion in this case was fair, the court identified the pertinent
considerations:
[T]he circumstances to be taken into account include the
importance of the decision to the asylum seeker and its possi-
ble effects; the nature of the decision itself; the framework of
statute and policy within which the decision is taken; the im-
migration officer as the decision-maker or the review board in
its case; the assistance with which they are provided by way of
information about "country conditions" and training; the man-
ner in which the screening process was established - by con-
sultation and agreement with and the assistance of, the
UNHCR; the procedure which was in fact adopted (for exam-
ple, the use of the questionnaire); the provision of a system of
review; and the nature of the problem which the screening pro-
cedure was designed to resolve.78
The court dismissed the argument of Hong Kong's counsel
that scarcity of resources must be considered in evaluating the
fairness of the procedure at issue,80 and found jurisprudence on
the issue from other jurisdictions to be essentially irrelevant.8
78. The court stated: "It is to be noted that in the record of the [training] Seminar
... there appears the words 'under no circumstances should any records of interview be
eliminated.' I agree and endorse that advice." Id. at 39.
79. Id. at 40.
80. The court stated:
Mr. Thomas further submits that I ought to take into account the resources
available or made available for dealing with the problem. I have no satisfactory
means of considering this objectively but as the procedure was established by
the Hong Kong Government it seems to me that it is the duty of those who
establish the procedure to establish one which is objectively fair in all the
circumstances.
Id. at 41.
81. The court reasoned:
It follows from this that what has been decided to be a necessary feature of a
fair procedure in other jurisdictions and in other circumstances even in asylum
cases where the same criteria are applied are not necessarily applicable here
and I do not find myself greatly assisted by many of those decisions. The cir-
cumstances of the present case are paramount.
Id. While such a narrow approach by the court may be permissible in evaluating the
fairness of a national system, it would constitute error in interpreting the meaning of the
terms of the international refugee treaties. Comparative jurisprudence should be consid-
ered in the construction of common treaty terms. See Helton, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca:
The Decision and Its Implications, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 45 (1987-88).
Such a narrow approach also ignores applicable international guidelines. See infra notes
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On the issue of whether the interview procedure was fair, the
court focused on several specific problems. The court acknowl-
edged that errors in translation "should be avoided where possi-
ble" but concluded that "double interpretation cannot be
avoided in any practical way."82 Conceding the significant im-
port of "double interpretation" regarding the question of fair-
ness, the court asserted that "fairness requires that. . . contem-
poraneous notes [taken during the interview] should be read
back . . . to the asylum seeker" during or at the conclusion of
the procedure to ensure accuracy and completeness. 8 3 According
to the court, "[t]his would give the opportunity to [both] check
the correctness of the [interview] notes and to add anything"
which the applicant may want considered. Further, this proce-
dure would give the immigration officer the opportunity to ask
supplemental questions if he considers further details "valuable
to his inquiry or fair to the applicant."8 4 The court concluded
that reading the notes taken during Mr. Do's interview would
have eliminated the error about his employment in a state-
owned rice mill and elicited crucial details about his departure
from the NEZ in which he lived and Vietnam. 85 Additionally,
the court asserted that apparent inconsistencies in the record
might have been resolved, clarifying in particular whether Mr.
Do's move to the NEZ was voluntary and detailing the living
conditions in the zone.86
99-107 and accompanying text.
82. R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do
Giau and others (1990 MP No. 570, 622, 623, 624, 636, 931, 932, 933, and 934) Supreme
Court of Hong Kong, miscellaneous proceedings (Mortimer, J.) at 45.
83. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In addressing the issue of fairness, the court stated:
It goes without saying that double interpretation ought to be avoided
where possible, but having regard to the scale of the problem faced in the
screening process I am quite satisfied that this double interpretation cannot be
avoided in any practical way. It is and should be regarded as an unusual fea-
ture of the process, regrettable, unavoidable but nevertheless of considerable
importance in this inquiry. Anyone who has had experience of double interpre-
tation must be well aware of the difficulties and problems which it creates.
Having regard to the risks of error and misunderstanding and the impor-
tance of the record in the decision making process and the likely effect of the
decision I have no doubt that fairness requires that the contemporaneous note
of the interview should be read back again through interpretation to the asy-
lum seeker at the end of the interview, or during it, in order to check a) its
accuracy, and b) its completeness. This would give the opportunity to check
the correctness of the note and also it would give the opportunity to add any-
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The court also found that several factors inherent in the
Hong Kong interviewing procedure compounded the factual er-
rors that occurred during the applicant's examination. First, the
court concluded that lack of legal counsel significant. In addi-
tion, the applicant could only "get a fair deal" if the immigra-
tion officer was "careful to sympathetically elicit" complete and
accurate information as the basis of a refugee status determina-
tion.8 7 The court suggested that an asylum seeker who is able to
provide a full narrative of "his own experiences, his fears and
the conditions in Vietnam as he saw them" would be hindered
from rendering such an account in the absence of a sympathetic
attempt on the part of the interviewer to obtain the
information.8
A basic infirmity in the case was the interviewer's failure to
apprise Mr. Do of the reasons his application for refugee status
was proposed for rejection. The court explained that "the failure
to read back the note did involve a real risk of injustice, if not
actual injustice because it'is probable that:
(1) The error about state employment would have been
corrected.
(2) Clarification of the inconsistencies in the note would
have been elicited especially about the possible voluntary na-
thing with which on second thoughts the applicant may wish to deal. Further,
it would give the immigration officer the opportunity to ask supplemental
questions if he considers further details may be of value to his enquiry or fair
to the applicant.
Had this been done in this case there is a real likelihood that the error
about his employment in a state-owned rice mill would have been corrected
and that further details about his departure from the NEZ and his situation
between leaving the NEZ and Vietnam would have been obtained.
Also, there is a real likelihood (not certainty) that the apparent inconsis-
tencies in the record would have been resolved. In particular, it may well have
become clear whether the applicant really said at the interview that the fam-
ily's move to the NEZ was voluntary and more information about the condi-
tions there may have been elicited.
Id. at 45, 46 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 47.
88. The court explained the errors in the interviewing procedures as follows:
It is at this stage that the applicant had received no counselling becomes
of relevance. Although he could give a perfectly satisfactory and full account of
his own experiences, his fears and the conditions in Vietnam as he saw them, it
is in the nature of the proceedings that he will only get a fair deal if the immi-
gration officer is careful to sympathetically elicit full information and to ensure
(as far as he is able) that the information he receives and records and upon
which his decision is based, is both full and accurate.
Id. at 47.
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ture of the NEZ [residence] and the applicant's departure from
it.
(3) Further details would have been disclosed about the
period between him leaving the NEZ and departing from
Vietnam. 9
The court stressed in its opinion that the immigration of-
ficer's understanding that the applicant had obtained state em-
ployment was a material factor in his decision to deny refugee
status: "The reasons show that he regarded this (inter-alia) as
being important if not conclusive that the applicant could not
have had a well-founded fear of persecution."90
The court reasoned further that
[t]he immigration officer's [mis]understanding about [the] em-
ployment [issue] probably coloured his thinking during the in-
terview to the extent that he did not seek further details
about... [Mr. Do's] departure from the NEZ and the period
thereafter because it would [have been] unnecessary for his de-
termination. If the employment point had been rectified he
would undoubtedly have gone into this [aspect of Mr. Do's life]
in detail.91
Taking these circumstances into consideration, the court
concluded that the interviewer's failure to read his notes back to
Mr. Do during the examination was "more than a 'technical' ir-
regularity." Because Mr. Do was unable to correct the exam-
iner's misunderstanding about the employment issue, there was
a "real risk" that the error affected the negative status
decision.92
The court then turned to the issue of whether the immigra-
tion officer's decision denying the applicant refugee status was
unreasonable. It concluded that because the interviewer materi-
ally relied on the erroneous belief that the applicant had under-
taken state employment, the decision to deny refugee status was
unreasonable.9 3 That matter was taken into account by the im-
89. Id. at 52-53
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The court explained its decision as follows:
I also find as part of my decision, that having taken into account and re-
lied upon in a most material manner that the applicant said in the interview
that he had state-employment when on my finding he said no such thing, this
renders the decision unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
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migration officer when he should not have done so.
In sum, the court asserted that "the immigration officer's
decision was flawed on the grounds of procedural irregularity, a
breach of natural justice and unreasonableness, and subject to
the effect of the review the decision must be quashed." '94
Having concluded that the initial status determination was
flawed, the court considered the government's contention that
the error was cured during the proceedings before the Review
Board. The court rejected the government's position and de-
clined to deny relief to the applicant on this ground. The court's
opinion focused on the influence the immigration officer's flawed
decision had upon the Review Board. "The record of proceed-
ings before the Review Board shows that this error was never
corrected and became part of the Review Board's decision. In-
deed the issue of fact was either never appreciated or was never
considered. '95 Furthermore, the court did not believe the appli-
cant should have been "placed at the disadvantage of seeking to
correct, in a written statement," an assertion that he had never
made which negatively influenced both the immigration officer
and the Review Board regarding their decisions to deny refugee
status. In sum, the RSRB proceedings did not cure the errors
that formed the basis of the immigration officer's decision.96
Finally, the court considered whether the Hong Kong Immi-
gration Ordinance precluded review of the Review Board's deci-
Id. at 54; see supra note 61.
94. R v. Director of Immigration and Refugee Status Review Board ex parte Do
Giau and others (1990 MP No. 570, 622, 624, 636, 931, 932, 933, and 934) Supreme Court
of Hong Kong, miscellaneous proceedings (Mortimer, J.) at 54.
95. Id. at 59, 60.
96. The court analyzed the proceedings before the Review Board:
[T]he record of proceedings suggests that the immigration officer's flawed
decision substantially influenced the Board. This is a matter upon which I
have already touched and I will further consider when dealing with the submis-
sion that the court's jurisdiction to review the Review Board's decision is
ousted by the Ordinance ....
Further, the applicant himself ought not to have been placed at the disad-
vantage of seeking to correct, in a written statement, something which on my
finding he never said to the immigration officer and which influenced both his
decision and the decision of the Review Board. The record of proceedings
before the Review Board shows that this error was never corrected and became
part of the Review Board's decision. Indeed the issue of fact was either never
appreciated or was never considered.
I reject the respondent's submission that I ought to exercise my discretion
not to allow relief on the basis that flaws in the immigration officer's decision
were cured by the Review Board review. They were not so cured.
1991] 285
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sion. According to the court, the Immigration Ordinance permit-
ted it to assert jurisdiction over the matter if the Review Board's
decision could properly be deemed a nullity. As such, the
"ouster clause" in the Immigration Ordinance would be inappli-
cable to the court's jurisdiction to consider the Review Board's
determination. 9 7
In this case, the court found no ouster, explaining:
[I]n making its decision the Review Board relied upon evi-
dence which had never been given to the immigration officer.
The applicant was placed in the position of seeking to correct
this error in his written submission to the Review Board. His
efforts failed. His evidence on the point was overlooked. He re-
mained unheard on the point and evidence he had never given
was accorded weight.
The results of the procedural irregularity or unfairness in
the immigration officer's decision were repeated and continued
through the Review Board hearing. On this matter, the Review
Board failed to comply with the requirements of natural jus-
tice. It failed to take into account that which it was required to
consider and based its decision on evidence never given which
it had no right to take into account.
... [T]hese flaws are of such a nature that the Review
Board's decision is a nullity so that Clause 13F(6) [of the Hong
Kong ordinance] does not oust the court's jurisdiction to re-
view that decision. It should be quashed as a nullity.9
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
At issue in Do Giau's decision were basic elements of refu-
gee status determination. In general, international refugee law
does not seek to prescribe the procedures to be followed by gov-
ernments in determining refugee status claims. Hong Kong, of
97. The court framed the question of the application of the ouster clause in the
Hong Kong ordinance as follows:
The question for my consideration is whether the Board's decision (right
or wrong) was made within its field of inquiry or jurisdiction so that it is pro-
tected from review by this court or whether the decision is properly to be held
to be a nullity so as not to be a decision at all within the Review Board's
jurisdiction.
Id. at 62.
98. Id. at 64, 65. In March 1991 this case and the following eight cases were settled
by the parties upon an arrangement whereby the Hong Kong authorities would re-deter-
mine the cases of the individuals under panels established from the Refugee Status Re-
view Board composed of members who had not previously been involved in the determi-
nations. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1991, at All, col. 1.
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course, might be said to have agreed to abide by certain interna-
tional standards under the CPA. In that connection, a Note on
Fair and Efficient Procedures was issued in 1990 by the UNHCR
in connection with the judicial challenge in Hong Kong.99 In the
Note, the UNHCR described its monitoring role in the Hong
Kong procedure as involving counseling of asylum seekers, moni-
toring of screening interviews, advice on general policy issues to
the government, and legal assistance to deserving asylum seekers
who take appeals. Specifically, the UNHCR emphasized the fol-
lowing relevant requirements:
The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to
the procedure to be followed (para. (e)(ii) of Conclusion No.
8).100 Given the vulnerable situation of an asylum seeker in an
alien environment, it is important that he/she should on arrival
receive appropriate information on how to submit his/her ap-
plication. Such advice is most effective on an individual basis
and is provided in many countries by legal counselling services,
funded by government, UNHCR or non-governmental sources.
The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, in-
cluding the services of a competent interpreter for submitting
his case to the authorities concerned: (para. (e)(iv) of Conclu-
sion No. 8). 1 1 This requirement entails, first of all, that the
applicant should be given the opportunity to present his/her
case as fully as possible. As refugee status is primarily an eval-
uation of the applicant's statement, the quality of interview is
crucial to a proper determination of the claim. Paragraphs 196-
205 of the Handbook0 2 deal with this aspect of the procedure
and make it clear that "while the burden of proof in principle
rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all
the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the ex-
aminer"'103 and also that the examiner should "ensure that the
applicant presents his case as fully as possible and with all
99. Note on the subject of the role of UNHCR in the Hong Kong procedure for
refugee status determination (copy on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter UNHCR Note].
100. UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS, supra note 8, at 17 (1980). Conclusions of the Execu-
tive Committee of the UNHCR Programme are among "soft-law" sources that provide
interpretive and informing principles on issues of international refugee protection. The
Executive Committee is a group of governments that meet annually in Geneva to oversee
the work of UNHCR and issue written "conclusions" on issues of protection at those
meetings.
101. Id.
102. See HANDBOOK, supra note 21.
103. HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at para. 196.
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available evidence.' 1 0 4 The interviewer therefore has a particu-
lar responsibility to ensure that the interview is comprehensive
and the records reflect accurately what has been said. The ref-
erence to "necessary facilities" could, in UNHCR's view, also
include legal advice and representation, if the applicant re-
quires these in order to present his case properly.
If the applicant is not recognized, "he should be given a
reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the
decision, either to the same or different authority, whether ad-
ministrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system"
(para. (e)(vi) of Conclusion No. 8)105 . . . .Although this re-
quirement is phrased in general terms, in UNHCR's view the
notion of "appeal for a formal reconsideration" includes some
basic principles of fairness applicable equally to judicial or ad-
ministrative reviews, such as the possibility for the applicant to
be heard by the review body and to be able to obtain legal ad-
vice and representation in order to make his submission; for
the reconsideration to be based on all relevant evidence; and
for a consistent and rational application of refugee criteria in
line with the guidelines established in the UNHCR Hand-
book.'08 UNHCR believes that the notion of fairness also re-
quires the review body to provide the grounds for its decision,
so that the applicant can be reassured that he has had a fair
hearing and the criteria have been applied properly.
The application should be examined by "qualified person-
nel having the necessary knowledge and experience, and an un-
derstanding of an applicant's particular difficulties and
needs."' 0 7 An understanding of the application of refugee crite-
ria as well as a knowledge of the situation in the country of
origin are necessary, in particular, for assessing an applicant's
credibility and the well-foundedness of his fear of persecution.
The applicant should be granted the benefit of the doubt
if his statement is coherent and plausible and does not run
counter to generally known facts. 08 Because of problems of ob-
taining evidence to substantiate a refugee claim, and the seri-
ous consequences which could result from an erroneous deci-
sion, the evidential requirements should be approached with
flexibility.10 9
104. HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at para. 205.
105. UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS, supra note 8, at 17.
106. See HANDBOOK, supra note 21.
107. HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at para. 190.
108. HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at paras. 203-204.
109. UNHCR Note, supra note 99, at paras. 4-9 (footnotes added to quotation).
[Vol. XVII'2288
JUDICIAL REVIEW
While the court in Do Giau's case was correct to reject an
unduly narrow approach to judicial review and the general pol-
icy justifications advanced by the crown, it failed to appreciate
fully how its observations about the paucity of legal assistance
and adequate interpretation for Vietnamese asylum seekers in
Hong Kong finds direct support in these international stan-
dards. 110 The failure to invoke these basic principles is perhaps
the greatest shortcoming of the decision. Other aspects of the
status determination procedure in Hong Kong, including the
failure of the RSRB to receive oral evidence or to give grounds
for its decision, while not found by the court to render the pro-
ceedings in Do Giau's case unfair, also clearly fail to meet inter-
national standards.'1 '
The Hong Kong High Court's decision is couched in rela-
tively narrow terms to provide specific relief in an individual
case.112 Notwithstanding its apparent narrowness, aspects of the
decision could have considerable consequence. For example, the
court's conclusion that it was not ousted from jurisdiction be-
cause the review is of executive error in the nature of a breach of
natural justice sets the stage for additional judicial review chal-
lenges. The courts in Hong Kong are thus likely to assume a
more interventionist role in the future in refugee cases.
While it cannot fairly be said that the decision ruled invalid
the Hong Kong status determination procedure, the court in Do
Giau's case made several observations which draw into question
the basic adequacy of the screening and review procedure in
Hong Kong. The paucity of legal counseling is a general fea-
110. In the United States, courts and commentators have suggested that such proce-
dural protections are required by the Constitution. See, e.g., Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d
32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (accurate and complete translation of official proceedings required
in order to comport with constitutional protection of right not to be returned to a place
of persecution); Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Asylum Proceedings, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1157 (1985).
111. Written reasons for denial are required in the United States asylum procedure.
8 C.F.R. § 208.15. The decision of the Court not to admit expert evidence failed to re-
spect the international principle of requiring adjudicators to be fully qualified to render
a decision and to accord the benefit of the doubt to applicants. See UNHCR Note, supra
note 99, at n.105.
112. There is no class action mechanism available to courts in the United Kingdom,
including Hong Kong, to require decisions on general issues with common factual and
legal predicates. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The absence of such a mechanism has
undoubtedly limited the role of the United Kingdom courts in addressing patterns and
practices of executive illegality. Compare McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 59
U.S.L.W. 4128 (1991).
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ture.113 The provision of legal counseling undoubtedly would as-
sist in the development of more coherent claims, and should re-
sult in increased positive recognition decisions in the first
instance as well as facilitating the development of appropriate
administrative records for judicial review of negative decisions.
Additionally, the court's suggestions regarding the difficul-
ties of double interpretation point to a fundamental weakness in
the procedure. Interpretation is frequently the weak link in asy-
lum adjudication systems. A double interpretation procedure,
like that used in Hong Kong, can only compound inaccuracies
and errors. Presumably, substantial numbers of rejections could
be judicially reviewed on these grounds alone if prejudicial mis-
interpretations can be identified.
Also, the court's virtual direction that the notes of the inter-
views be read back to and subscribed by the individual appli-
cants is one that is of significant potential in terms of future
challenges to the procedure. If heeded, this admonition will as-
sist reviewing authorities and the courts in ascertaining whether
improper factors are being considered, or whether a failure to
consider pertinent factors, has resulted in an unfair
determination.
In sum, the decision in Do Giau's case provides the founda-
tion for further judicial intervention and activism in the Hong
Kong courts.114 The judiciary will increasingly be called upon to
measure government policies concerning refugees against the
strictures of legal entitlements. 1 5
In any event, the pendency of the litigation clearly has had
salutary effects. One improvement in the process was the deci-
sion in April 1990 by the RSRB to give reasons in connection
with the denial of refugee status." 6 This improvement was im-
plemented in October 1990, and there are still problems with the
113. Only recently have the authorities countenanced pilot projects to attempt legal
counseling for Vietnamese boat people prior to their interviews in the status determina-
tion procedure in Hong Kong. See South China Morning Post, May 27, 1990, at 2. The
experience is too early to be definitive in terms of the utility of the initiative.
114. The litigative effort has also contributed to the development of a growing group
of lawyers in Hong Kong who are growing increasingly accustomed to utilizing the courts
to protect the human rights of refugees.
115. See, e.g., South China Morning Post, March 12, 1991, at 1 (possible forthcom-
ing challenge to the detention of Vietnamese).
116. Telephone interviews with UNHCR officials, in Geneva (Oct. 1990 and Jan.
1991). Anonymity was requested by the officials.
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sufficiency of reasons given. 117 But the overall approval rate is
rising. From July through December the rate increased from
nineteen to twenty-five percent in terms of first instance deci-
sions approved, and from six to eight percent in terms of rever-
sals of negative decisions on appeal.1 8 In sum, progress has been
made on refugee protection issues in Hong Kong, and the courts
have been, and will continue to be, instruments to achieve such
progress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, the decision of the Hong Kong High Court
in Do Giau's case is one that has both juridical and political sig-
nificance. It will raise the level and intensity of the legal and
political debates on whether the screening and review procedure
in Hong Kong is fair, preliminary to any decision to countenance
the mandatory return of Vietnamese boat people to Vietnam
when rejected for refugee status. Further judicial pronounce-
ments are inevitable, and should clearly establish the courts as
mediators between claimed sovereign prerogatives and the
human rights of refugees.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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